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Abstract
Different notions of equivalence, such as the prominent notions of strong and uniform equivalence,
have been studied in Answer-Set Programming, mainly for the purpose of identifying programs that
can serve as substitutes without altering the semantics, for instance in program optimization. Such
semantic comparisons are usually characterized by various selections of models in the logic of Here-
and-There (HT). For uniform equivalence however, correct characterizations in terms of HT-models
can only be obtained for finite theories, respectively programs. In this article, we show that a selection
of countermodels in HT captures uniform equivalence also for infinite theories. This result is turned
into coherent characterizations of the different notions of equivalence by countermodels, as well as
by a mixture of HT-models and countermodels (so-called equivalence interpretations). Moreover,
we generalize the so-called notion of relativized hyperequivalence for programs to propositional
theories, and apply the same methodology in order to obtain a semantic characterization which is
amenable to infinite settings. This allows for a lifting of the results to first-order theories under a very
general semantics given in terms of a quantified version of HT. We thus obtain a general framework
for the study of various notions of equivalence for theories under answer-set semantics. Moreover, we
prove an expedient property that allows for a simplified treatment of extended signatures, and provide
further results for non-ground logic programs. In particular, uniform equivalence coincides under
open and ordinary answer-set semantics, and for finite non-ground programs under these semantics,
also the usual characterization of uniform equivalence in terms of maximal and total HT-models of
the grounding is correct, even for infinite domains, when corresponding ground programs are infinite.
To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP).
KEYWORDS: answer-set programming, uniform equivalence, relativized equivalence, knowledge
representation.
1 Introduction
Answer-Set Programming (ASP) is a fundamental paradigm for nonmonotonic knowledge
representation (Baral 2003) that encompasses logic programming under the answer-set se-
mantics. It is distinguished by a purely declarative semantics and efficient solvers, such
∗ A preliminary version of this work appeared in the Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Logic
Programming (ICLP), M. Garcia de la Banda and E. Pontelli (Eds.), LNCS 5366, pp. 99–113, Springer, 2008.
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as, e.g., DLV (Leone et al. 2006), Smodels (Simons et al. 2002), clasp (Gebser et al. 2007),
GnT (Janhunen and Niemela¨ 2004), and ASSAT (Lin and Zhao 2004). Initially providing
a semantics for rules with default negation in the body, the answer-set semantics (or stable-
model semantics) (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) has been continually extended in terms of
expressiveness and syntactic freedom. Starting with disjunctive rules, allowing for disjunc-
tions in rule heads, negation in rule heads was considered and the development continued
by allowing nested expressions, i.e., implication-free propositional formulas in the head
and the body. Eventually, arbitrary propositional theories were given a non-classical min-
imal model semantics as their answer sets, which has recently been lifted to a general
answer-set semantics for first-order theories (Ferraris et al. 2007).
In a different line of research, the restriction to Herbrand domains for programs with
variables, i.e., non-ground programs, has been relaxed in order to cope with open do-
mains (Heymans et al. 2007), which is desirable for certain applications, e.g., in concep-
tual modelling and Semantic Web reasoning. The resulting open answer-set semantics has
been further generalized by dropping the unique names assumption (Heymans et al. 2008)
for application settings where it does not apply, for instance, when combining ontologies
with nonmontonic rules (de Bruijn et al. 2007).
As for a logical characterization of the answer-set semantics, the logic of Here-and-
There (HT), a nonclassical logic extending intuitionistic logic, served as a basis. Equilib-
rium Logic selects certain minimal HT-models for characterizing the answer-set seman-
tics for propositional theories and programs. It has recently been extended to Quantified
Equilibrium Logic (QEL) for first-order theories on the basis of a quantified version of
Here-and-There (QHT) (Pearce and Valverde 2006; Pearce and Valverde 2008). Equilib-
rium Logic serves as a viable formalism for the study of semantic comparisons of theories
and programs, like different notions of equivalence (Eiter et al. 2005; Lifschitz et al. 2007;
Woltran 2008; Faber and Konczak 2006; Faber et al. 2008; Inoue and Sakama 2004). The
practical relevance of this research originates in program optimization tasks that rely on
modifications that preserve certain properties (Eiter et al. 2006; Lin and Chen 2007; Janhunen et al. 2009;
Janhunen 2008; Sakama and Inoue 2009).
In previous work (Fink 2008), we complemented this line of research by solving an
open problem concerning uniform equivalence of propositional theories and programs. In-
tuitively, two propositional logic programs are uniformly equivalent if they have the same
answer sets under the addition of an arbitrary set of atoms to both programs. Former char-
acterizations of uniform equivalence, i.e., selections of HT-models based on a maximality
criterion (Eiter et al. 2007), failed to capture uniform equivalence for infinite propositional
programs—a problem that becomes relevant when turning to the non-ground setting, re-
spectively first-order theories, where infinite domains, such as the natural numbers, are
encountered in many application domains. In (Fink 2008), this has been remedied resort-
ing to countermodels in HT.
In this article, we extend the former work beyond the basic notions of strong and uniform
equivalence. So-called relativized notions thereof have been considered in order to capture
more fine-grained semantical comparisons (see e.g., (Eiter et al. 2007; Pearce et al. 2007)).
Intuitively, these notions restrict the alphabet to be considered for potential additions, i.e.,
programs or sets of facts, respectively. A further refinement distinguishes the alphabet for
atoms allowed in rule heads of an addition from the alphabet for atoms allowed in rule
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bodies (Woltran 2008). The various notions of equivalence that can be formalized this way
have recently been called relativized hyperequivalence (Truszczynski and Woltran 2008a;
Truszczynski and Woltran 2008b).
Similarly as for uniform equivalence, semantic characterizations of relativized hyper-
equivalence have been obtained by means of a maximality criterion so far, and only for
finite propositional settings. We address this issue and apply the same methods as for uni-
form equivalence in order to obtain alternative characterizations. They can be stated with-
out any finiteness restrictions and easily lift to first-order settings over infinite domains.
The new contributions compared to (Fink 2008) can be summarized as follows:
• We provide full proofs for the characterizations of uniform equivalence, but also
classical equivalence, answer-set equivalence, and strong equivalence, in terms of
countermodels in HT, respectively in terms of equivalence interpretations, devel-
oped in (Fink 2008).
• We extend these ideas to relativized settings of equivalence and generalize the no-
tion of relativized hyperequivalence to propositional theories. Abstracting from the
notions of rule head and rule body, we obtain respective notions of relativization
for theories. We provide novel semantical characterizations in terms of equivalence
interpretations for this generalized setting, again without any finiteness restrictions.
• We lift these results to first-order theories by means of QHT, essentially introduc-
ing, besides uniform equivalence, relativized hyperequivalence for first-order theo-
ries under the most general form of answer-set semantics currently considered.
• We correct an informal claim that has been made in connection with a property
which allows for a simplified treatment of extended signatures and holds for QHT
countermodels. Based on an erroneous example (Example 5 in (Fink 2008)), it was
claimed that this property does not hold for QHT-models, which is not the case.
• Eventually, we reconsider logic programs and prove, using the established character-
ization, that uniform equivalence coincides for open and ordinary answer-set seman-
tics, as well as other results which have been stated without proof in (Fink 2008).
Our results provide an elegant, uniform model-theoretic framework for the characteri-
zation of the different notions of equivalence considered in ASP. They generalize to first-
order theories without finiteness restrictions, and are relevant for practical ASP systems
that handle finite non-ground programs over infinite domains.
In particular relativized notions of equivalence are relevant in practice. For instance, pro-
gram composition from modular parts is an issue of increasing interest in ASP (Dao-Tran et al. 2009;
Janhunen et al. 2009). It usually hinges on semantic properties specified for an interface
(input/output for ‘calling’ or connecting modules), i.e., properties that require compliance
on a subset of the underlying language. Our results might be exploited to provide correct-
ness guarantees for specific compositions.
Another benefit comes with the generalization to first-order theories. It facilitates and
simplifies the study of combinations of ASP with other formalisms, or means for external
data access, in a unifying formalism. Especially the combination of nonmonotonic rules
with description logics is a highly relevant instance of such a combination. Our results can
initiate or reduce difficulties in the study of modularity and optimization for such combined
settings. (cf. (Fink and Pearce 2009) for preliminary work in this direction).
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For the sake of presentation, the technical content is split into two parts, discussing
the propositional case first, and addressing first-order theories and nonground programs
in a second part. In particular, the organization is as follows: Section 2 introduces essen-
tial preliminaries for the treatment of the propositional case. In Section 3, we develop a
characterization of uniform equivalence by means of countermodels in HT, and proceed
with an alternative characterization in terms of equivalence interpretations, before we turn
to generalizing and characterizing relativized hyperequivalence for propositional theories.
After some introductory background on quantified HT, Section 4 deals with generaliza-
tions of previous results to first-order theories under generalized answer-set semantics. In
Section 5, we apply our characterization of uniform equivalence to logic programs under
various extended semantics in comparison with the traditional semantics over Herbrand
domains, before we draw some conclusions in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
We start with the propositional setting and briefly summarize the necessary background.
Corresponding first-order formalisms will be introduced when discussing first-order theo-
ries, respectively non-ground logic programs.
2.1 Propositional Here-and-There
In the propositional case we consider formulas of a propositional signature L, i.e., a set of
propositional variables, and the connectives ∧, ∨, →, and ⊥ for conjunction, disjunction,
implication, and falsity, respectively. Furthermore we make use of the following abbrevia-
tions: φ ≡ ψ for (φ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ); ¬φ for φ → ⊥; and ⊤ for ⊥ → ⊥. A formula is
said to be factual1 if it is built using ∧, ∨, ⊥, and ¬ (i.e., implications of the form φ→ ⊥),
only. A theory Γ is factual if every formula of Γ has this property.
The logic of here-and-there is an intermediate logic between intuitionistic logic and clas-
sical logic. Like intuitionistic logic it can be semantically characterized by Kripke models,
in particular using just two worlds, namely “here” and “there” (assuming that the here
world is ordered before the there world). Accordingly, interpretations (HT-interpretations)
are pairs (X,Y ) of sets of atoms from L, such that X ⊆ Y . An HT-interpretation is total
if X = Y . The intuition is that atoms in X (the here part) are considered to be true, atoms
not in Y (the there part) are considered to be false, while the remaining atoms (from Y \X)
are undefined.
We denote classical satisfaction of a formulaφ by an interpretationX , i.e., a set of atoms,
asX |= φ, whereas satisfaction in the logic of here-and-there (an HT-model), symbolically
(X,Y ) |= φ, is defined recursively:
1. (X,Y ) |= a if a ∈ X , for any atom a,
2. (X,Y ) 6|= ⊥,
3. (X,Y ) |= φ ∧ ψ if (X,Y ) |= φ and (X,Y ) |= ψ,
1 When uniform equivalence of theories is considered, then factual theories can be considered instead of facts—
hence the terminology—see also the discussion at the end of this section.
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4. (X,Y ) |= φ ∨ ψ if (X,Y ) |= φ or (X,Y ) |= ψ,
5. (X,Y ) |= φ→ ψ if (i) (X,Y ) 6|= φ or (X,Y ) |= ψ, and (ii) Y |= φ→ ψ2.
An HT-interpretation (X,Y ) satisfies a theory Γ, iff it satisfies all formulas φ ∈ Γ. For
an axiomatic proof system see, e.g., (Lifschitz et al. 2007).
A total HT-interpretation (Y, Y ) is called an equilibrium model of a theoryΓ, iff (Y, Y ) |=
Γ and for all HT-interpretations (X,Y ), such that X ⊂ Y , it holds that (X,Y ) 6|= Γ. An
interpretation Y is an answer set of Γ iff (Y, Y ) is an equilibrium model of Γ.
We will make use of the following simple properties: if (X,Y ) |= Γ then (Y, Y ) |= Γ;
and (X,Y ) |= ¬φ iff Y |= ¬φ; as well as of the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 5 in (Pearce and Valverde 2004))
If φ is a factual propositional formula, (X,Y ) |= φ, and X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ Y , then (X ′, Y ) |= φ.
2.2 Propositional Logic Programming
A (disjunctive) rule r is of the form
a1 ∨ · · · ∨ ak ∨ ¬ak+1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬al ← b1, . . . , bm,¬bm+1, . . . ,¬bn, (1)
where a1, . . . , al, b1, . . . , bn are atoms of a propositional signature L, such that l ≥ k ≥ 0,
n ≥ m ≥ 0, and l + n > 0. We refer to “¬” as default negation. The head of r is
the set H(r) = {a1, . . . , ak,¬ak+1, . . . ,¬al}, and the body of r is denoted by B(r) =
{b1, . . . , bm, ¬bm+1, . . . , ¬bn}. Furthermore, we define the sets H+(r) = {a1, . . . , ak},
H−(r) = {ak+1, . . . , al}, B+(r) = {b1, . . . , bm}, and B−(r) = {bm+1, . . . , bn}. A pro-
gram Π (over L) is a set of rules (over L).
An interpretation I , i.e., a set of atoms, satisfies a rule r, symbolically I |= r, iff I ∩
H+(r) 6= ∅ orH−(r) 6⊆ I , ifB+(r) ⊆ I andB−(r)∩I = ∅. Adapted from (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991),
the reduct of a program Π with respect to an interpretation I , symbolically ΠI , is given by
the set of rules
a1 ∨ · · · ∨ ak ← b1, . . . , bm,
obtained from rules in Π, such that H−(r) ⊆ I and B−(r) ∩ I = ∅.
An interpretation I is called an answer set of Π iff I |= ΠI and it is subset minimal
among the interpretations of L with this property.
2.3 Notions of Equivalence
For any two theories, respectively programs, and a potential extension by Γ, we con-
sider the following notions of equivalence which have been shown to be the only forms
of equivalence obtained by varying the logical form of extensions in the propositional case
in (Pearce and Valverde 2004).
2 That is, Y satisfies φ→ ψ classically.
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Definition 1
Two theories Γ1,Γ2 over L are called
• classically equivalent, Γ1 ≡c Γ2, if and only if they have the same classical models;
• answer-set equivalent, Γ1 ≡a Γ2, if and only if they have the same answer sets, i.e.,
equilibrium models;
• strongly equivalent, Γ1 ≡s Γ2, if and only if, for any theory Γ over L′ ⊇ L, Γ1 ∪ Γ
and Γ2 ∪ Γ are answer-set equivalent;
• uniformly equivalent,Γ1 ≡u Γ2, if and only if, for any factual theory Γ overL′ ⊇ L,
Γ1 ∪ Γ and Γ2 ∪ Γ are answer-set equivalent.
Emanating from a logic programming setting, uniform equivalence is usually understood
wrt. sets of facts (i.e., atoms). Obviously, uniform equivalence wrt. factual theories implies
uniform equivalence wrt. sets of facts. The converse direction has been shown as well for
general propositional theories (cf. Theorem 2 in (Pearce and Valverde 2004)). Therefore,
in general there is no difference whether uniform equivalence is considered wrt. sets of
facts or factual theories. The latter may be regarded as facts, i.e., rules with an empty body,
of so-called nested logic program rules. One might also consider sets of disjunctions of
atomic formulas and their negations (i.e., clauses), accounting for facts according to the
definition of program rules in this article. Note that clauses constitute factual formulas
and the classical transformation of clauses into implications is not valid under answer set
semantics (respectively in HT).
3 Equivalence of Propositional Theories by HT-Countermodels
Uniform equivalence is usually characterized by so-called UE-models, i.e., total and max-
imal non-total HT-models, which fail to capture uniform equivalence for infinite proposi-
tional theories.
Example 1 ((Eiter et al. 2007))
Let Γ1 and Γ2 over L = {ai | i ≥ 1} be the following propositional theories
Γ1 = {ai | i ≥ 1}, and Γ2 = {¬ai → ai, ai+1 → ai | i ≥ 1}.
Both, Γ1 and Γ2, have the single total HT-model (L,L). Furthermore, Γ1 has no non-total
HT-model (X,L), i.e, such that X ⊂ L, while Γ2 has the non-total HT-models (Xi,L),
where Xi = {a1, . . . , ai} for i ≥ 0. Both theories have the same total and maximal non-
total (namely none) HT-models. But they are not uniformly equivalent as witnessed by the
fact that (L,L) is an equilibrium model of Γ1 but not of Γ2.
The reason for this failure is the inability of the concept of maximality to capture differ-
ences exhibited by an infinite number of HT-models.
3.1 HT-Countermodels
The above problem can be avoided by taking HT-countermodels that satisfy a closure
condition instead of the maximality criterion.
Equivalences in ASP by Countermodels in the Logic of Here-and-There 7
Definition 2
An HT-interpretation (X,Y ) is an HT-countermodel of a theory Γ if (X,Y ) 6|= Γ. The set
of HT-countermodels of a theory Γ is denoted by Cs(Γ).
Intuitively, an HT-interpretation fails to be an HT-model of a theory Γ when the theory
is not satisfied at one of the worlds (here or there). Note that satisfaction at the there world
amounts to classical satisfaction of the theory by Y . A simple consequence is that if Y 6|=
Γ, then (X,Y ) is an HT countermodel of Γ for any X ⊆ Y . At the here world, classical
satisfaction is a sufficient condition but not necessary. For logic programs, satisfaction at
the here world is precisely captured by the reduct of the program Π wrt. the interpretation
at the there world, i.e., if X |= ΠY .
Definition 3
A total HT-interpretation (Y, Y ) is total-closed in a set S of HT-interpretations if (X,Y ) ∈
S for every X ⊆ Y . We say that an HT-interpretation (X,Y ) is
• closed in a set S of HT-interpretations if (X ′, Y ) ∈ S for every X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ Y .
• there-closed in a set S of HT-interpretations if (Y, Y ) 6∈ S and (X ′, Y ) ∈ S for
every X ⊆ X ′ ⊂ Y .
A set S of HT-interpretations is total-closed, if every total HT-interpretation (Y, Y ) ∈ S
is total-closed in S. By the remarks on the satisfaction at the there world above, it is ob-
vious that every total HT-countermodel of a theory is also total-closed in Cs(Γ). Conse-
quently, Cs(Γ) is a total-closed set for any theory Γ. By the same argument, if (X,Y ) is
an HT-countermodel such that X ⊂ Y and Y 6|= Γ, then (X,Y ) is closed in Cs(Γ). The
more relevant cases concerning the characterization of equivalence are HT-countermodels
(X,Y ) such that Y |= Γ.
Example 2
Consider the theory Γ1 in Example 1 and a non-total HT-interpretation (X,L). Since
(X,L) is non-total, X ⊂ L holds, and therefore (X,L) 6|= ai, for some ai ∈ L. Thus,
we have identified a HT-countermodel of Γ1. Moreover the same argument holds for any
non-total HT-interpretation of the from (X ′,L) (in particular such that X ⊆ X ′ ⊂ Y ).
Therefore, (X,L) is there-closed in Cs(Γ1).
The intuition that, essentially, there-closed countermodels can be used instead of max-
imal non-total HT-models for characterizing uniform equivalence draws from the follow-
ing observation. If (X,Y ) is a maximal non-total HT-model, then every (X ′, Y ), such
that X ⊂ X ′ ⊂ Y , is a there-closed HT-countermodel. However, there-closed HT-
countermodels are not sensitive to the problems that infinite chains cause for maximality.
Given a theory Γ, let Cu(Γ) denote the set of there-closed HT-interpretations in Cs(Γ).
Theorem 1
Two propositional theories Γ1, Γ2 are uniformly equivalent iff they have the same sets of
there-closed HT-countermodels, in symbols Γ1 ≡u Γ2 iff Cu(Γ1) = Cu(Γ2).
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Proof
For the only-if direction, assume that two theories, Γ1 and Γ2, are uniformly equivalent.
Then they are classically equivalent, i.e., they coincide on total HT-models, and therefore
also on total HT-countermodels. Since a total HT-interpretation (Y, Y ) is there-closed in
Cs(Γ) if (Y, Y ) 6∈ Cs(Γ), i.e., if (Y, Y ) is an HT-model of Γ, this proves that Γ1 and
Γ2 coincide on total HT-interpretations that are there-closed in Cs(Γ1), respectively in
Cs(Γ2).
To prove our claim, it remains to show that Γ1 and Γ2 coincide on non-total there-
closed HT-countermodels (X,Y ), i.e., such that (Y, Y ) is an HT-model of both theories.
Consider such a there-closed HT-countermodel of Γ1. Then, (Y, Y ) is a total HT-model
of Γ1 ∪ X and no X ′ ⊂ Y exists such that (X ′, Y ) |= Γ1 ∪ X , either because it is an
HT-countermodel of Γ1 (in case X ⊆ X ′ ⊂ Y ) or of X (in case X ′ ⊂ X). Thus, Y
is an answer set of Γ1 ∪ X and, by hypothesis since X is factual, it is also an answer
set of Γ2 ∪ X . The latter implies for all X ⊆ X ′ ⊂ Y that (X ′, Y ) 6|= Γ2 ∪ X . All
these HT-interpretations are HT-models of X . Therefore we conclude that they all are HT-
countermodels of Γ2 and hence (X,Y ) is a there-closed HT-countermodel of Γ2. Again by
symmetric arguments, we establish the same for any there-closed HT countermodel (X,Y )
of Γ2 such that (Y, Y ) is a common total HT-model. This proves that Γ1 and Γ2 have the
same sets of there-closed HT countermodels.
For the if direction, assume that two theories, Γ1 and Γ2, have the same sets of there-
closed HT-countermodels. This implies that they have the same total HT-models (since
these are there-closed). Consider any factual theory Γ′ such that Y is an answer set of
Γ1 ∪ Γ′. We show that Y is an answer set of Γ2 ∪ Γ′ as well. Clearly, (Y, Y ) |= Γ1 ∪ Γ′
implies (Y, Y ) |= Γ′ and therefore (Y, Y ) |= Γ2 ∪ Γ′. Consider any X ⊂ Y . Since Y is an
answer set of Γ1 ∪ Γ′, it holds that (X,Y ) 6|= Γ1 ∪ Γ′. We show that (X,Y ) 6|= Γ2 ∪ Γ′. If
(X,Y ) 6|= Γ′ this is trivial, and in particular the case if (X,Y ) |= Γ1. So let us consider the
case where (X,Y ) 6|= Γ1 and (X,Y ) |= Γ′. By Lemma 1 we conclude from the latter that,
for any X ⊆ X ′ ⊂ Y , (X ′, Y ) |= Γ′. Therefore, (X ′, Y ) 6|= Γ1, as well. This implies that
(X,Y ) is a there-closed HT-countermodel of Γ1. By hypothesis, (X,Y ) is a there-closed
HT-countermodel of Γ2, i.e., (X,Y ) 6|= Γ2. Consequently, (X,Y ) 6|= Γ2 ∪ Γ′. Since this
argument applies to any X ⊂ Y , (Y, Y ) is an equilibrium model of Γ2 ∪ Γ′, i.e., Y is an
answer set of Γ2 ∪ Γ′. The argument with Γ1 and Γ2 interchanged, proves that Y is an
answer set of Γ1 ∪Γ′ if it is an answer set of Γ2 ∪Γ′. Therefore, the answer sets of Γ1 ∪Γ′
and Γ2 ∪ Γ′ coincide for any factual Γ′, i.e., Γ1 and Γ2 are uniformly equivalent.
Example 3
Reconsider the theories in Example 1. Every non-total HT-interpretation (Xi,L) is an HT-
countermodel of Γ1, and thus, each of them is there-closed in Cs(Γ1). On the other hand,
none of these HT-interpretations is an HT-countermodel of Γ2. Therefore, Γ1 and Γ2 are
not uniformly equivalent.
Countermodels have the drawback however, that they cannot be characterized directly
in HT itself, i.e., as the HT-models of a ‘dual’ theory. The usage of “dual” here is non-
standard compared to its application to particular calculi or consequence relations, but it
likewise conveys the idea of a dual concept. In this sense HT therefore is non-dual:
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Proposition 1
Given a theory Γ, in general there is no theory Γ′ such that (X,Y ) is an HT-countermodel
of Γ iff it is a HT-model of Γ′, for any HT-interpretation (X,Y ).
Proof
As observed in (Cabalar and Ferraris 2007), any theory has a total-closed set of counter-
models. Consider the theory Γ = {a} and suppose there exists a theory Γ′, such that
(X,Y ) is an HT-countermodel of Γ iff it is an HT-model of Γ′. Then, vice versa, (X,Y )
is an HT-countermodel of Γ′ iff it is an HT-model of Γ. Since for Y = {a}, (Y, Y ) is an
HT-model of Γ, we conclude that (Y, Y ) is an HT-countermodel of Γ′. Because any theory
has a total-closed set of countermodels, it follows that (∅, Y ) is an HT-countermodel of Γ′,
hence, an HT-model of Γ. Contradiction.
3.2 Characterizing Equivalence by means of Equivalence Interpretations
The characterization of countermodels by a theory in HT essentially fails due to total HT-
countermodels. However, total HT-countermodels of a theory are not necessary for char-
acterizing equivalence, in the sense that they can be replaced by total HT-models of the
theory for this purpose.
Definition 4
An HT-countermodel (X,Y ) of a theory Γ is called a here-countermodel of Γ if Y |= Γ.
Definition 5
An HT-interpretation is an equivalence interpretation of a theory Γ if it is a total HT-model
of Γ or a here-countermodel of Γ. The set of equivalence interpretations of a theory Γ is
denoted by Es(Γ).
Theorem 2
Two theories Γ1 and Γ2 coincide on their HT-countermodels iff they have the same equiv-
alence interpretations, symbolically Cs(Γ1) = Cs(Γ2) iff Es(Γ1) = Es(Γ2).
Proof
For the only-if direction, assume that two theories, Γ1 and Γ2, have the same sets of HT-
countermodels. This implies that they have the same here-countermodels. Furthermore,
since the total HT-countermodels are equal, they also coincide on total HT-models. Con-
sequently, Γ1 and Γ2 have the same equivalence interpretations.
For the if direction, assume that two theories, Γ1 and Γ2, coincide on their equivalence
interpretations. Then they have the same total HT-models and hence the same total HT-
countermodels. Since total HT-countermodels of every theory are total-closed in the set
of HT-countermodels, the sets of HT-countermodels coincide on all HT-interpretations
(X,Y ) such that (Y, Y ) is a (total) HT countermodel. All remaining HT-countermodels are
here-countermodels and therefore coincide by hypothesis and the definition of equivalence
interpretations. This proves the claim.
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As a consequence of this result, and the usual relationships on HT-models, we can char-
acterize equivalences of propositional theories also by selections of equivalence interpre-
tations, i.e., a mixture of non-total here-countermodels and total HT-models, such that the
characterizations, in particular for uniform equivalence, are also correct for infinite theo-
ries.
Definition 6
Given a theory Γ, we denote by
• Cc(Γ), respectively Ec(Γ), the restriction to total HT-interpretations in Cs(Γ), re-
spectively in Es(Γ);
• Ca(Γ) the set of there-closed HT-interpretations of the form (∅, Y ) in Cs(Γ), and by
Ea(Γ) the set of total-closed HT-interpretations in Es(Γ) (i.e., equilibrium models);
• Eu(Γ) the set of closed HT-interpretations in Es(Γ).
By means of the above sets of HT-countermodels, respectively equivalence interpreta-
tions, equivalences of propositional theories can be characterized as follows.
Corollary 1
Given two propositional theories Γ1 and Γ2, the following propositions are equivalent for
e ∈ {c, a, s, u}:
(1) Γ1 ≡e Γ2; (2) Ce(Γ1) = Ce(Γ2); (3) Ee(Γ1) = Ee(Γ2).
Example 4
In our running example, Cu(Γ1) 6= Cu(Γ2), as well as Eu(Γ1) 6= Eu(Γ2), by the remarks
on non-total HT-interpretations in Example 3.
Since equivalence interpretations do not encompass total HT-countermodels, we attempt
a direct characterization in HT.
Lemma 2
For any HT-interpretation (X,Y ) of signature L and τǫ = {¬¬a → a | a ∈ L}, it holds
that (X,Y ) |= τǫ iff X = Y .
Proof
(X,Y ) |= τǫ for all a ∈ L iff (X,Y ) |= ¬¬a → a for all a ∈ L iff, for every a ∈ L, it
holds that (X,Y ) 6|= ¬¬a or (X,Y ) |= a, and Y |= ¬¬a → a. The latter is a tautology,
and (X,Y ) 6|= ¬¬a iff a 6∈ Y . We conclude that (X,Y ) |= τǫ iff (X,Y ) |= a for all
a ∈ Y , i.e., iff X = Y .
By means of this lemma, we can use formulas of the form ¬¬a → a to ensure for a
given formula φ of Γ that if (X,Y ) |= φ then X = Y , i.e., that the HT-interpretation is
total.
Proposition 2
Let M be an HT-interpretation over L. Then, M ∈ Es(Γ) for a theory Γ iff M |= Γφ for
some φ ∈ Γ, where Γφ = {¬¬ψ | ψ ∈ Γ} ∪ {φ→ (¬¬a→ a) | a ∈ L}.
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Proof
For the only-if direction, assume (X,Y ) is an equivalence interpretation of Γ. Then Y |= ψ
for all ψ ∈ Γ and therefore (X,Y ) |= ¬¬ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ. If X = Y , then by Lemma 2,
(X,Y ) also satisfies ¬¬a → a for all a ∈ L. In this case, (X,Y ) |= Γφ for all φ ∈ Γ.
We continue with the case where X ⊂ Y . Then, (X,Y ) is a here-countermodel of Γ, i.e.,
there exists φ ∈ Γ such that (X,Y ) 6|= φ. This implies that (X,Y ) |= φ → (¬¬a → a)
for all a ∈ L, i.e., (X,Y ) |= Γφ. This proves the claim for X ⊂ Y .
For the if direction, assume that (X,Y ) |= Γφ for some φ ∈ Γ. Then, (X,Y ) |=
¬¬ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ, which implies Y |= ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ. Consequently, (X,Y ) is an
equivalence interpretation of Γ if X = Y . If X ⊂ Y , we conclude that (X,Y ) does not
satisfy ¬¬a → a for some a ∈ L by Lemma 2. However, (X,Y ) |= Γφ for some φ ∈ Γ,
hence (X,Y ) |= φ → (¬¬a → a) for all a ∈ L. Therefore, (X,Y ) 6|= φ must hold for
some φ ∈ Γ. This proves, since X ⊂ Y , that (X,Y ) is a here-countermodel of Γ, i.e., an
equivalence interpretation of Γ.
For infinite propositional theories, we thus end up with a characterization of equivalence
interpretations as the union of the HT-models of an infinite number of (infinite) theories. At
least for finite theories, however, a characterization in terms of a (finite) theory is obtained
(even for a potentially extended infinite signature).
If L′ ⊃ L and M = (X,Y ) is an HT-interpretation over L′, then M |L denotes the
restriction of M to L: M |L = (X |L, Y |L). The restriction is totality preserving, if X ⊂ Y
implies X |L ⊂ Y |L.
Proposition 3
Let Γ be a theory over L, let L′ ⊃ L, and let M an HT-interpretation over L′ such that
M |L is totality preserving. Then, M ∈ Cs(Γ) implies M |L ∈ Cs(Γ).
Proof
Let M = (X ′, Y ′), M |L = (X,Y ), and assume M 6|= Γ. First, suppose M is total, hence,
Y ′ 6|= Γ. Then, Y 6|= Γ, because otherwise Y ′ |= Γ would hold, since Γ is over L. This
proves the claim for total HT-countermodels, and since HT countermodels are total-closed,
for any HT-countermodelM = (X ′, Y ′), such that Y ′ 6|= Γ.
We continue with the case that Y ′ |= Γ. Then X ′ ⊂ Y ′ holds, which means that M
is an equivalence interpretation of Γ. Therefore, M 6|= φ for some φ ∈ Γ. Additionally,
M |= ¬¬ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ (recall that Y ′ |= Γ). This implies M |= Γφ, where Γφ =
{¬¬ψ | ψ ∈ Γ} ∪ {φ → (¬¬a → a) | a ∈ L}. Therefore, M |L |= Γφ, i.e., M |L
is an equivalence interpretation of Γ. Since the restriction is totality preserving, M |L is
non-total. This proves M |L 6|= Γ.
This eventually enables the characterization of the HT-countermodels of a finite theory
by another finite theory, as stated in the next result.
Theorem 3






ψ, and M |L is totality preserving.
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Proof
For the only-if direction letM ∈ Es(Γ). IfM is total thenM |L is total andM |= Γ implies





ψ. So let M be non-total. We
show that M |L is totality-preserving. Towards a contradiction assume the contrary. Then,
M |L is total. From Y |= Γ we conclude Y |L |= Γ and the same for X |L by X |L = Y |L.
Because Γ is over L, X |= Γ follows, hence M |= Γ, which is a contradiction. Thus, M |L
is totality-preserving. Then M |L is also non-total and in Cs(Γ). Therefore M |L ∈ Es(Γ),










ψ and M |L is totality preserving. If M is total then M |L is total and M |L |=
Γ, which implies M |= Γ, since Γ is over L. If M is non-total then M |L is non-total and
M |L 6|= Γ, which implies M 6|= Γ.
Example 5
Let Γ = {a} over L = {a} and recall what the proof of Proposition 1 established: There
is no theory Γ′ such that (X,Y ) is an HT-model of Γ′ iff it is an HT-countermodel of
Γ. According to Theorem 3 however, we can characterize Es(Γ) by means of totality-
preserving HT-models of the theory Γ′ = {¬¬ a ∧ (a → (¬¬a → a))}. Consider any
HT-interpretation (X,Y ) over L′ ⊃ L. It is easily verified that (X,Y ) |= Γ′ iff a ∈ Y . If
additionally a ∈ X and X ⊂ Y , then (X |L, Y |L) is not totality preserving. Thus, (X,Y )
is a totality-preserving HT-model of Γ′ iff a ∈ Y and either X = Y or a 6∈ X . These
interpretations respectively correspond to the total models and the here-countermodels,
i.e., the equivalence interpretations of Γ over L′.
3.3 Relativized Hyperequivalence for Propositional Theories
We now turn to the notion of relativized hyperequivalence. The term ‘hyperequivalence’
has been coined in the context of ASP, as a general expression for different forms of equiv-
alence, which guarantee that the semantics is preserved under the addition of arbitrary pro-
grams (called contexts) from a particular class of programs (Truszczynski and Woltran 2008a).
Relativized hyperequivalence emanates from the study of relativized notions of equiva-
lence by restricting contexts to particular alphabets (see e.g., (Eiter et al. 2007; Pearce et al. 2007)).
It has been generalized to the setting, where possibly different alphabets are used to restrict
the head atoms and the body atoms allowed to appear in context rules (Woltran 2008).
While up to now relativized hyperequivalence has only been studied for finite programs,
we aim at a generalization of relativized hyperequivalence for propositional theories un-
der the answer-set semantics, without any finiteness restrictions. For this purpose, we first
generalize the notions of ‘head atom’ and ‘body atom’ for theories.
The occurrence of an atom a in a formula φ is called positive if φ is implication free, if
a occurs in the consequent of an implication in φ, or if φ is of the form (φ1 → φ2) → φ3
and a occors in φ1. An occurrence of a is called negative if a occurs in the antecedent of an
implication. The notion of positive and negative occurrence is extended to (sub-)formulas
in the obvious way. Note that any occurrence under negation therefore is a negative occur-
rence, and that the occurrence of an atom or subformula may be both positive and negative,
for instance the occurrence of b in a→ (b→ ⊥), viz. a→ ¬b.
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A propositional theory Γ over A+ ∪ A−, where A+ and A− are sets of propositional
variables, is called an A+-A−-theory if every formula in Γ has positive occurrences of
atoms from A+, and negative occurrences of atoms from A−, only. Note that ⊥ is always
allowed to appear both, positively and negatively. An A+-A−-theory is called extended, if
additionally factual formulas over A+ are permitted.
By means of these notions, relativized hyperequivalence for propositional theories can
be expressed as follows, which is a proper generalization of the logic programming setting.
Definition 7
Two propositional theories Γ1,Γ2 over L are called relativized hyperequivalent wrt. A+
and A−, symbolically Γ1 A
+
A−
≡ Γ2, iff for any A+-A−-theory Γ over L′ ⊇ L, Γ1 ∪ Γ and
Γ2 ∪ Γ are answer-set equivalent.
Towards a characterization of relativized hyperequivalence, our goal is to follow the
same methodology that we used to characterize uniform equivalence, i.e., resorting to HT-
countermodels and respective closure conditions. However, while in the logic program-
ming setting such closure conditions may be obtained from certain monotonicity properties
of the program reduct, we first have to establish corresponding properties for theories. A
first property in this respect is the following. Note that although the next result is stated
for extended A+-A−-theories (for reasons which will become clear later), it trivially also
holds for any (non-extended)A+-A−-theory.
Proposition 4
Consider an extended propositional A+-A−-theory Γ, and an HT-interpretation (X,Y ).
Then, (X,Y ) |= Γ implies (X ′, Y ) |= Γ, for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that X |A+ ⊆ X ′|A+ and
X ′|A− ⊆ X |A− .
Proof
Consider any A+-A−-formula φ in Γ, i.e., any formula that has positive occurrences of
atoms from A+, and negative occurrences of atoms from A−, only. We show by induction
on the formula structure of φ, that for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that X |A+ ⊆ X ′|A+ and X ′|A− ⊆
X |A− :
(a) (X,Y ) |= φ implies (X ′, Y ) |= φ if φ is a positive occurrence; and
(b) (X,Y ) 6|= φ implies (X ′, Y ) |= φ if φ is a negative occurrence.
For the base case, consider any atomic formula φ, and suppose first that (a) the occur-
rence of φ is a positive occurrence. Then, (X,Y ) |= φ implies that φ is not ⊥, and thus is
an atom a fromA+ such that a ∈ X . Since X |A+ ⊆ X ′|A+ for all X ′ under consideration,
we conclude that a ∈ X ′. Hence, (X ′, Y ) |= φ. Suppose (b) φ is a negative occurrence. If
(X,Y ) 6|= φ, then either φ is⊥, and (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ follows trivially. Otherwise, φ is an atom
b from A−, such that b 6∈ X |A− . Since X ′|A− ⊆ X |A− for all X ′ under consideration, we
conclude that b 6∈ X ′, i.e., (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ. This proves (a) and (b) for atomic formulas.
For the induction step, assume that (a) and (b) hold for any A+-A−-formula of connec-
tive nesting depth n−1, and let φ be a formula of connective nesting depth n. Consider the
case where φ is of the form φ1 ∧φ2, respectively φ1 ∨φ2. If φ is a positive occurrence (a),
then so are φ1 and φ2, both of connective nesting depth depth n− 1. From (X,Y ) |= φ we
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conclude (X,Y ) |= φ1 and (or) (X,Y ) |= φ2. The induction hypothesis applies, proving
(X ′, Y ) |= φ1 and (or) (X ′, Y ) |= φ2, for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that X |A+ ⊆ X ′|A+ and
X ′|A− = X |A− , i.e., (X ′, Y ) |= φ for all X ′ under consideration. In case φ is a nega-
tive occurrence (b), then so are φ1 and φ2, both of connective nesting depth n − 1. Then,
(X,Y ) 6|= φ implies (X,Y ) 6|= φ1 or (and) (X,Y ) 6|= φ2, and the same holds for any
(X ′, Y ) under consideration by induction hypothesis. This proves (X,Y ) 6|= φ implies
(X ′, Y ) |= φ.
Finally, let φ be of the form φ1 → φ2. Then, independent of whether φ occurs pos-
itively or negatively, φ1 is a negative occurrence and φ2 is a positive occurrence, both
of connective nesting depth n − 1. First, suppose that φ is a positive occurrence (a), as
well as that (X,Y ) |= φ. Towards a contradiction assume that there exists X ′ ⊆ Y
such that X |A+ ⊆ X ′|A+ , X ′|A− ⊆ X |A− , and (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ. Since (X,Y ) |= φ im-
plies that Y |= φ, we conclude that both, (X ′, Y ) |= φ1 and (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ2, hold. From
the latter, since φ2 is a positive occurrence of connective nesting depth n − 1, it follows
that (X,Y ) 6|= φ2 (otherwise by induction hypothesis (a) (X ′, Y ) |= φ2). This implies
(X,Y ) 6|= φ1 since (X,Y ) |= φ. However, φ1 is a negative occurrence of connective
nesting depth n − 1, thus by induction hypothesis (b) we conclude that (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ1,
a contradiction. Therefore, (X ′, Y ) |= φ for all X ′ under consideration, which proves
(a). For (b), let φ be a negative occurrence and suppose (X,Y ) 6|= φ. If Y 6|= φ, then
also (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ for all X ′ under consideration. In case Y |= φ, we conclude that
(X,Y ) |= φ1 and (X,Y ) 6|= φ2. Since φ is a negative occurrence, not only φ1 but also φ2
is a negative occurrence, both of connective nesting depth n − 1. Therefore, by induction
hypothesis (b) we conclude that (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ2. Moreover, also because φ is a negative
occurrence, φ1 is a positive occurrence as well. Hence, by induction hypothesis (a) we
conclude (X ′, Y ) |= φ1 from (X,Y ) |= φ1, viz. (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ, for all X ′ under consider-
ation. This concludes the inductive argument and proves (a) and (b) for A+-A−-formulas
of arbitrary connective nesting.
Next, we turn to factual formulasψ in Γ, and prove by induction on the formula structure
of ψ, that
(c) (X,Y ) |= ψ implies (X ′, Y ) |= ψ, for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that X |A+ ⊆ X ′|A+ and
X ′|A− ⊆ X |A− ; and
(d) (Y, Y ) 6|= ψ implies (X ′, Y ) 6|= ψ, for all X ′ ⊆ Y .
For the base case, consider any atomic formulaψ, and suppose first that (c) (X,Y ) |= ψ.
Then, ψ is not ⊥, but an atom a from A+ such that a ∈ X . Since X |A+ ⊆ X ′|A+ for all
X ′ such that X |A+ ⊆ X ′|A+ and X ′|A− ⊆ X |A− , we conclude that a ∈ X ′. Hence,
(X ′, Y ) |= ψ. For (d), assume (Y, Y ) 6|= ψ. Then ψ is ⊥ or ψ is a an atom not in Y . In
the former case, (X ′, Y ) 6|= ψ follows trivially for all X ′ ⊆ Y . In the latter case, the atom
also cannot be a member of any X ′ such that X ′ ⊆ Y . Therefore, (X ′, Y ) 6|= ψ, for all
X ′ ⊆ Y . This proves (c) and (d) for atomic formulas.
For the induction step, assume that (c) and (d) hold for any factual formula of connective
nesting depth n−1, and let ψ be a factual formula of connective nesting depth n. Consider
the case where ψ is of the form ψ1 ∧ ψ2, respectively ψ1 ∨ ψ2. Since ψ is factual, so are
ψ1 and ψ2, both of connective nesting depth depth n − 1. In case (c), from (X,Y ) |= ψ
we conclude (X,Y ) |= ψ1 and (or) (X,Y ) |= ψ2. The induction hypothesis applies,
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proving (X ′, Y ) |= ψ1 and (or) (X ′, Y ) |= ψ2, for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that X |A+ ⊆ X ′|A+
and X ′|A− ⊆ X |A− , i.e., (X ′, Y ) |= ψ for all X ′ under consideration. Assume (d), i.e.,
(Y, Y ) 6|= ψ. As a consequence, (Y, Y ) 6|= ψ1 or (and) (Y, Y ) 6|= ψ2, hence by induction
hypothesis, for all X ′ ⊆ Y , it holds that (X ′, Y ) 6|= ψ1 or (and) (X ′, Y ) 6|= ψ2. Therefore,
(X ′, Y ) 6|= ψ, for all X ′ ⊆ Y .
Finally, let ψ be of the formψ1 → ⊥. Then,ψ1 is factual and of connective nesting depth
depth n − 1. In case (c), if (X,Y ) |= ψ, then Y |= ψ, hence Y 6|= ψ1, i.e., (Y, Y ) 6|= ψ1
and by induction hypothesis (d), the same holds for any (X ′, Y ) such that X ′ ⊆ Y . Thus,
in particular for X ′ ⊆ Y such that X |A+ ⊆ X ′|A+ and X ′|A− ⊆ X |A− , it follows that
(X ′, Y ) 6|= ψ1. Moreover, Y |= ψ, and therefore (X ′, Y ) |= ψ → ⊥, for all X ′ ⊆ Y such
that X |A+ ⊆ X ′|A+ and X ′|A− ⊆ X |A− . For (d), assume (Y, Y ) 6|= ψ. Consequently
Y 6|= ψ, and this implies (X ′, Y ) 6|= ψ, for all X ′ ⊆ Y . This concludes the inductive argu-
ment and proves (c) and (d) for factual formulas over A+ of arbitrary connective nesting.
Concerning the claim of the proposition, since (X,Y ) |= Γ implies (X,Y ) |= φ and
(X,Y ) |= ψ, for every A+-A−-formula φ in Γ and every factual formula ψ in Γ, we
conclude that (X ′, Y ) |= φ and (X ′, Y ) |= ψ, for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that X |A+ ⊆ X ′|A+
and X ′|A− ⊆ X |A− . This proves (X ′, Y ) |= Γ, for all X ′ under consideration.
Complementary to this result, given a total HT-model of an (extended) A+-A−-theory,
we can infer its satisfaction for the following class of non-total HT-interpretations.
Proposition 5
Consider an extended propositionalA+-A−-theoryΓ, and a total HT-interpretation (Y, Y ).
Then, (Y, Y ) |= Γ implies (X ′, Y ) |= Γ, for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that X ′|A+ = Y |A+ .
Proof
Consider any A+-A−-formula φ in Γ, i.e., any formula that has positive occurrences of
atoms from A+, and negative occurrences of atoms from A−, only. We show by induction
on the formula structure of φ, that for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that X ′|A+ = Y |A+ :
(a) (Y, Y ) |= φ implies (X ′, Y ) |= φ if φ is a positive occurrence; and
(b) (Y, Y ) 6|= φ implies (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ if φ is a negative occurrence.
For the base case, consider any atomic formulaφ, and suppose first (a) that φ is a positive
occurrence such that (Y, Y ) |= φ. Then φ is not⊥, and thus is an atom a fromA+ such that
a ∈ Y . Since X ′|A+ = Y |A+ for all X ′ under consideration, we conclude that a ∈ X ′.
Hence, (X ′, Y ) |= φ. Suppose (b) φ is a negative occurrence. If (Y, Y ) 6|= φ, then φ is
either ⊥, or an atom b from A−, such that b 6∈ Y . Since X ′ ⊆ Y implies X ′|A− ⊆ Y |A−
for all X ′ under consideration, we conclude that b 6∈ X ′. Hence, (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ.
For the induction step, assume that (a) and (b) hold for any A+-A−-formula of connec-
tive nesting depth n − 1, and let φ be a formula of connective nesting depth n. Consider
the case where φ is of the form φ1 ∧ φ2, respectively φ1 ∨ φ2. If φ is a positive occurrence
(a), then so are φ1 and φ2, both of connective nesting depth depth n− 1. From (Y, Y ) |= φ
we conclude (Y, Y ) |= φ1 and (or) (Y, Y ) |= φ2. The induction hypothesis applies, prov-
ing (X ′, Y ) |= φ1 and (or) (X ′, Y ) |= φ2, for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that X ′|A+ = Y |A+ ,
i.e., (X ′, Y ) |= φ for all X ′ under consideration. In case φ is a negative occurrence (b),
then so are φ1 and φ2, both of connective nesting depth n− 1. Then, (Y, Y ) 6|= φ implies
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(Y, Y ) 6|= φ1 or (and) (Y, Y ) 6|= φ2, and the same holds for any (X ′, Y ) under consid-
eration by induction hypothesis. This proves (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ. Finally, let φ be of the form
φ1 → φ2. Then, independent of whether φ occurs positively or negatively, φ1 is a negative
occurrence and φ2 is a positive occurrence, both of connective nesting depth n − 1. First,
suppose (Y, Y ) |= φ. Towards a contradiction assume that there exists X ′ ⊆ Y such that
X ′|A+ = Y |A+ and (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ. Since (Y, Y ) |= φ implies that Y |= φ, we conclude
that both, (X ′, Y ) |= φ1 and (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ2, hold. From the latter, since φ2 is a positive
occurrence of connective nesting depth n − 1, it follows that (Y, Y ) 6|= φ2 (otherwise by
induction hypothesis (a) (X ′, Y ) |= φ2). This implies (Y, Y ) 6|= φ1 since (Y, Y ) |= φ.
However, φ1 is a negative occurrence of connective nesting depth n− 1, thus by induction
hypothesis (b) we conclude that (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ1, a contradiction. Therefore, (X ′, Y ) |= φ
for all X ′ under consideration, which proves (a). For (b), let φ be a negative occurrence
and suppose (Y, Y ) 6|= φ. Then Y 6|= φ, hence also (X ′, Y ) 6|= φ for all X ′ under consider-
ation. This concludes the inductive argument and proves (a) and (b) for A+-A−-formulas
of arbitrary connective nesting.
Next, we turn to factual formulasψ in Γ, and prove by induction on the formula structure
of ψ, that (Y, Y ) |= ψ implies (X ′, Y ) |= ψ, for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that X ′|A+ = Y |A+ .
For the base case, consider any atomic formula ψ, and suppose that (Y, Y ) |= ψ. Then,
ψ is not⊥, but an atom a from A+ such that a ∈ Y . Since X ′|A+ = Y |A+ for all X ′ under
consideration, we conclude that a ∈ X ′. Hence, (X ′, Y ) |= ψ, for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that
X ′|A+ = Y |A+ .
For the induction step, assume that the claim holds for any factual formula of connective
nesting depth n−1, and let ψ be a factual formula of connective nesting depth n. Consider
the case where ψ is of the form ψ1 ∧ ψ2, respectively ψ1 ∨ ψ2. Since ψ is factual, so are
ψ1 and ψ2, both of connective nesting depth depth n − 1. From (Y, Y ) |= ψ we conclude
(Y, Y ) |= ψ1 and (or) (Y, Y ) |= ψ2. The induction hypothesis applies, proving (X ′, Y ) |=
ψ1 and (or) (X ′, Y ) |= ψ2, for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that X ′|A+ = Y |A+ , i.e., (X ′, Y ) |= ψ
for all X ′ under consideration. Finally, let ψ be of the form ψ1 → ⊥. Then, ψ1 is factual
and of connective nesting depth depth n− 1. If (Y, Y ) |= ψ, then Y |= ψ, hence Y 6|= ψ1,
i.e., (Y, Y ) 6|= ψ1 and by Case (d) in the proof of Proposition 4, the same holds for any
(X ′, Y ) such that X ′ ⊆ Y . Thus, in particular for X ′ ⊆ Y such that X ′|A+ = Y |A+ , it
follows that (X ′, Y ) 6|= ψ1. Moreover, Y |= ψ, and therefore (X ′, Y ) |= ψ → ⊥, for all
X ′ ⊆ Y such that X ′|A+ = Y |A+ . This concludes the inductive argument and proves the
claim for factual formulas over A+ of arbitrary connective nesting.
Concerning the claim of the proposition, since (Y, Y ) |= Γ implies (Y, Y ) |= φ and
(Y, Y ) |= ψ, for every A+-A−-formula φ in Γ and every factual formula ψ in Γ, we
conclude that (X ′, Y ) |= φ and (X ′, Y ) |= ψ, for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that X ′|A+ = Y |A+ .
This proves (X ′, Y ) |= Γ, for all X ′ under consideration.
Having established these properties of A+-A−-theories, we can state respective closure
conditions for HT-interpretations referring to countermodels, or which we consider more
convenient here, referring to equivalence interpretations.
Definition 8
Given a propositional theory Γ over L, sets of propositional variables A+ ⊆ L′, A− ⊆ L′,
L′ ⊇ L, and an HT-interpretation (X,Y ), we say that
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• (Y, Y ) is A+-total iff (Y |A+ , Y ) is closed in Es(Γ);
• (X,Y ) is A+-closed in Es(Γ) iff (X ′, Y ) ∈ Es(Γ), for all X ′ ⊆ Y such that
X |A+ ⊆ X
′|A+ and X ′|A− ⊆ X |A− .
With these concepts, a semantic characterization of relativized hyperequivalence for
propositional theories can be established by means of the following characteristic equiva-
lence interpretations.
Definition 9
An HT-interpretation (X,Y ) is an HT-hyperequivalence interpretation wrt. A+ and A−
of a propositional theory Γ iff (Y, Y ) is A+-total and there exists an HT-interpretation
(X ′, Y ) such that X = X ′|A+∪A− and (X ′, Y ) is A+-closed in Es(Γ).
The set of HT-hyperequivalence interpretations wrt. A+ and A− of a propositional theory
Γ is denoted by EA+
A−
(Γ).
This definition intuitively generalizes the characterization of Woltran (2008) for the logic
programming setting to propositional theories. Note however, that rather than resorting to
HT-models and a maximality criterion, the above definition refers to equivalence interpre-
tations (i.e., HT-countermodels in case of non-totality) and respective closure conditions.
As in the case of uniform equivalence, this not only simplifies the definition, but also
avoids difficulties in infinite settings. The next result establishes that HT-hyperequivalence
interpretations precisely characterize relativized hyperequivalence.
Theorem 4
Two propositional theories Γ1,Γ2 are relativized hyperequivalent wrt. A+ and A− if and












In the following, we will use the following notational simplification: For any set of atoms
X , we write X+ for X |A+ , and X− for X |A− .
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case is symmetric). Note that (X,Y ) ∈ EA+
A−
(Γ1) implies that (Y, Y ) is A+-total, i.e.,
(Y+, Y ) is closed in Es(Γ1). This implies that (Y+, Y ) is in EA
+
A−
(Γ1). Suppose (Y+, Y )
is not in EA+
A−
(Γ2). Then, either (Y, Y ) 6|= Γ2, or there exists Y+ ⊆ X ′ ⊂ Y such that
(X ′, Y ) |= Γ2. Let Γ = Y+ and observe that in both cases Y is not an answer set of
Γ2 ∪ Γ. In the former case because (Y, Y ) 6|= Γ2 ∪ Γ, in the latter because X ′ ⊂ Y
and (X ′, Y ) |= Γ2 ∪ Γ (note that (X ′, Y ) |= Γ by Proposition 5). However, Y is an
answer set of Γ1 ∪ Γ. Indeed, (Y+, Y ) is closed in Es(Γ1). And for any X ′ ⊂ Y such that
Y+ 6⊆ X ′+, obviously (X ′, Y ) is a non-total HT-countermodel of Γ. Consequently (Y, Y )




Thus, we conclude that (Y+, Y ) ∈ EA
+
A−
(Γ2). Note that therefore (Y, Y ) is A+-total for
Γ2, which implies that (Y |A, Y ) is in EA
+
A−
(Γ2), hence X ⊂ Y |A and X+ ⊂ Y+. Consider
the following theory Γ = X+ ∪ {α → β | α ∈ Y− \X−, β ∈ Y+ \X+}. We show that
Y is an answer set of Γ1 ∪ Γ. Obviously, Y |= Γ because X+ ⊂ Y+ and β ∈ Y for every
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β ∈ Y+ \ X+. Therefore, (Y, Y ) |= Γ1 ∪ Γ. Towards a contradiction, assume that there
exists X ′ ⊂ Y such that (X ′, Y ) |= Γ1 ∪ Γ. From (X ′, Y ) |= Γ, we conclude that either
X ′+ = Y+, or that X+ ⊆ X ′+ ⊂ Y+ and X ′− ⊆ X−. In both cases, (X ′, Y ) 6|= Γ1. In
the former case because (Y, Y ) is A+-total, i.e., (Y+, Y ) is closed in Es(Γ1). In the latter
case, it is a consequence of the fact that (X,Y ) ∈ EA+
A−
(Γ1), which implies (X ′, Y ) 6|= Γ1
by A+-closure. This contradicts our assumption concerning the existence of X ′ ⊂ Y such
that (X ′, Y ) |= Γ1 ∪ Γ, and proves that Y is an answer set of Γ1 ∪ Γ. However, Y is not
an answer set of Γ2 ∪ Γ. To wit, since (X,Y ) 6∈ EA
+
A−
(Γ2), there exists X ′ ⊂ Y such
that X+ ⊆ X ′+, X ′− ⊆ X−, and (X ′, Y ) |= Γ2. Moreover, (X ′, Y ) is an HT-model of
Γ. Observe that X ′− ⊆ X− implies that (X ′, Y ) is an HT-model of every formula of the
form α → β in Γ. Hence, (X ′, Y ) |= Γ2 ∪ Γ, and since X ′ ⊂ Y , it follows that Y is not



















6≡ Γ2. W.l.o.g. let Y be an answer set of Γ1 ∪ Γ for some A+-A−-theory Γ,
such that Y is not an answer set of Γ2∪Γ (the other case is symmetric). Then, (Y, Y ) is an
equivalence interpretation of both, Γ1 and Γ, and (Y+, Y ) is closed in Es(Γ1 ∪ Γ), which
implies (taking Proposition 5 into account) that (Y, Y ) is A+-total for Γ1 and (Y |A, Y ) is
in EA+
A−
(Γ1). Therefore, (Y |A, Y ) is also in EA
+
A−
(Γ2), with the consequence that (Y, Y ) is
in Es(Γ2), and thus (Y, Y ) ∈ Es(Γ2 ∪ Γ). Since by assumption Y is not an answer set of
Γ2 ∪ Γ, there exists X ⊂ Y such that (X,Y ) 6∈ Es(Γ2 ∪ Γ), i.e., (X,Y ) |= Γ2 ∪ Γ. Since
(Y |A, Y ) ∈ EA
+
A−
(Γ2), it holds that X |A ⊂ Y |A. Moreover, X+ ⊂ Y+ due to A+-totality
of (Y, Y ). Clearly, (X |A, Y ) is not in EA
+
A−
(Γ2) as witnessed by (X,Y ) |= Γ2, and thus













clude that there exists X ′ ⊆ Y , such that X+ ⊆ X ′+, X ′− ⊆ X−, and (X ′, Y ) 6∈ Es(Γ1),
i.e., X ′ ⊂ Y and (X ′, Y ) |= Γ1. By Proposition 4, (X,Y ) |= Γ implies (X ′, Y ) |= Γ.
Consequently, (X ′, Y ) |= Γ1 ∪ Γ, and since X ′ ⊂ Y , this contradicts our assumption that




Like in the logic programming setting, the framework obtained by the consideration of
relativized hyperequivalence interpretations provides a general unified characterization of
semantic characterizations of equivalence notions. In other words, the notions of equiva-
lence considered in the previous subsection are obtained as special cases. For this purpose,
one needs to refer to the universal alphabet (respectively signature), denoted by A, ex-
plicitely. Then, by definition, setting A+ = A− = ∅ amounts to answer-set equivalence,
A+ = A− = A yields strong equivalence, and A+ = A, A− = ∅ characterizes uniform
equivalence. The latter is not by definition but follows from two simple observations: ev-
ery set of facts over A is a A-∅-theory, and every A-∅-theory is a factual theory modulo
formulas of the form ⊥ → φ, which are tautologies in HT.
Corollary 2
Given two propositional theories Γ1 and Γ2 over L ⊆ A, the following propositions are
equivalent for e ∈ {a, s, u}, A+(a) = A−(a) = ∅, A+(s) = A−(s) = A, A+(u) = A,
and A−(u) = ∅:
(1) Γ1 ≡e Γ2; (2) Γ1 A
+(e)
A−(e)≡ Γ2.
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In these particular cases, not only the notions of equivalence but also the characteris-
tic semantic structures coincide, i.e., relativized hyperequivalence interpretations coincide
with the respective characteristic sets of equivalence interpretations.
Proposition 6
Let Γ be a propositional theory over L ⊆ A, and let e ∈ {a, s, u}, A+(a) = A−(a) = ∅,





First consider answer-set equivalence, i.e., e = a and A+ = A− = ∅. Then for any HT-




A−(e)(Γ) iff (∅, Y ) is there-
closed in Es(Γ) and X = ∅. The former follows from the first condition in Definition 9
since Y |A+ = ∅, and the latter from the second condition in Definition 9, i.e., from the
existence of an X ′ such that X = X ′|A+ (since X ′|∅ = ∅ for any X ′). Note that X = ∅
and (∅, Y ) there-closed in Es(Γ) are exactly the requirements for (X,Y ) ∈ Ea(Γ). This
proves (X,Y ) ∈ EA+
A−
(Γ) iff (X,Y ) ∈ Ea(Γ).
Turning to strong equivalence, let e = s and A+ = A− = A. Then for any HT-




A−(e)(Γ) iff (Y, Y ) in
Es(Γ) and (X,Y ) in Es(Γ). The former follows from the first condition in Definition 9
since Y |A = Y , and the latter from the second condition in Definition 9, i.e., from the
existence of an X ′ such that X = X ′|A (which implies X ′ = X since X ′|A = X ′ for
any X ′) and such that X ′′ ∈ Es(Γ) for all X ′′ ⊆ Y where X ′|A = X ′′|A (i.e., for
X ′′ = X ′ = X). Note that (X,Y ) ∈ Es(Γ) implies (Y, Y ) ∈ Es(Γ). Consequently, it
holds that (X,Y ) ∈ EA+
A−
(Γ) iff (X,Y ) ∈ Es(Γ).
Eventually consider uniform equivalence, i.e., e = u, A+ = A, and A− = ∅. In this





A−(e)(Γ), for any HT-interpretation (X,Y ) over A, iff
(Y, Y ) in Es(Γ) and (X ′, Y ) in Es(Γ) for all X ⊆ X ′′ ⊆ Y . The former follows from
the first condition in Definition 9 since Y |A = Y , and the latter from the second condition
in Definition 9, i.e., from the existence of an X ′ such that X = X ′|A (which implies
X ′ = X since X ′|A = X ′ for any X ′) and such that X ′′ ∈ Es(Γ) for all X ′′ ⊆ Y where
X ′|A ⊆ X ′′|A (i.e., for X ′ = X ⊆ X ′′ ⊆ Y ). Note that this are exactly the requirements




iff (X,Y ) ∈ Eu(Γ), which proves the claim.
Moreover, a setting whereA+ = A− is termed relativized strong equivalence, andA− =
∅ denotes relativized uniform equivalence. A further remark is in place, however. While we
proved for uniform equivalence of propositional theories, that it is indifferent to whether
we restrict additions (contexts) to sets of atoms or whether we allow for factual theories,A-
∅-theories syntactically do not encompass factual theories, since negation, i.e., formulas of
the form a→ ⊥, are not permitted. One question that this raises is: would allowing factual
theories as contexts make a difference for relativized notions of uniform equivalence?
The answer is by inspection of the proof of Theorem 4 in connection with Proposi-
tion 4 and Proposition 5. Recall that the propositions have been stated for extended A+-
A−-theories. Therefore, the only-if direction of Theorem 4 also holds for extended A+-
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A−-theories. Since the if direction just referred to A+-A−-theories (which, trivially, are
extended A+-A−-theories too), we obtain the following.
Corollary 3
Two propositional theories Γ1,Γ2 are relativized hyperequivalent wrt. extended A+-A−-
theories if and only if they coincide on their HT-hyperequivalence interpretations wrt. A+
and A−.
Thus, also relativized uniform equivalence is independent of whether sets of atoms or
factual theories are permitted as contexts. More generally, for any notion of relativized
hyperequivalence, factual theories over A+ can be allowed in the context without altering
the notion of equivalence captured. This holds essentially due to Proposition 4, which
generalizes Lemma 1 (Lemma 5 in (Pearce and Valverde 2004)) in this respect.
A final result establishes, that the notion of relativized hyperequivalence which has been
introduced in this section is a proper generalization of the respective logic programming
version to the more general case of propositional theories under answer-set semantics. It
is a straight forward consequence of Theorem 4, since the A+-A−-theories in the proof of
the if direction consist of formulas corresponding to rules with heads restricted to positive
atoms from A+ and body atoms from A−. Let us say that two propositional programs Π1
and Π2 are relativized hyperequivalent wrt. A+ and A− in the logic programming sense,
in symbols Π1 A
+
A−
≡ lp Π2, if and only if Π1 ∪ Π ≡a Π2 ∪Π for any program Π, such that
H−(r) = ∅, H+(r) ⊆ A+, and B(r) ⊆ A−, for all r ∈ Π.
Corollary 4








4 Generalization to First-Order Theories
Since the characterizations, in particular of uniform equivalence, presented in the previous
section capture also infinite theories, they pave the way for generalizing this notion of
equivalence to non-ground settings without any finiteness restrictions. In this section we
study first-order theories.
As first-order theories we consider sets of sentences (closed formulas) of a first-order
signature L = 〈F ,P〉 in the sense of classical first-order logic. Hence, F and P are pair-
wise disjoint sets of function symbols and predicate symbols with an associated arity, re-
spectively. Elements ofF with arity 0 are called object constants. A 0-ary predicate symbol
is a propositional constant. Formulas are constructed as usual and variable-free formulas
or theories are called ground. A sentence is said to be factual if it is built using connectives
∧, ∨, ∃, ∀, and ¬ (i.e., implications of the form φ→ ⊥), only. A theory Γ is factual if every
sentence of Γ has this property. The abbreviations introduced for propositional formulas
carry over: φ ≡ ψ for (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ); ¬φ for φ→ ⊥; and ⊤ for ⊥ → ⊥.
4.1 Static Quantified Logic of Here-and-There
Semantically we refer to the static quantified version of here-and-there with decidable
equality as captured axiomatically by the system QHTs= (Pearce and Valverde 2006; Lifschitz et al. 2007;
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Pearce and Valverde 2008). It is characterized by Kripke models of two worlds with a com-
mon universe (hence static) that interpret function symbols in the same way.
More formally, consider a first-order interpretation I of a first-order signature L on a
universe U . We denote by LI the extension of L obtained by adding pairwise distinct
names cε as object constants for the objects in the universe, i.e., for each ε ∈ U . We write
CU for the set {cε | ε ∈ U} and identify I with its extension to LI given by I(cε) = ε.
Furthermore, let tI denote the value assigned by I to a ground term t (of signature LI ), let
LF denote the restriction of L to function symbols (thus including object constants), and
let BP,CU be the set of atomic formulas built using predicates from P and constants CU .
We represent a first-order interpretation I of L on U as a pair 〈I|LF , I|CU 〉,3 where I|LF
is the restriction of I on function symbols, and I|CU is the set of atomic formulas from
BP,CU which are satisfied in I . Correspondingly, classical satisfaction of a sentence φ by
a first-order interpretation 〈I|LF , I|CU 〉 is denoted by 〈I|LF , I|CU 〉 |= φ. We also define a
subset relation for first-order interpretations I1, I2 of L on U (ie., over the same domain)
by I1 ⊆ I2 if I1|LF = I2|LF and I1|CU ⊆ I2|CU .
A QHT-interpretation of L is a triple 〈I, J,K〉, such that (i) I is an interpretation of LF
on U , and (ii) J ⊆ K ⊆ BP,CU .
The satisfaction of a sentence φ of signatureLI by a QHT-interpretationM = 〈I, J,K〉
(a QHT-model) is defined as:
1. M |= p(t1, . . . , tn) if p(ctI
1
, . . . , ctIn) ∈ J ;
2. M |= t1 = t2 if tI1 = tI2;
3. M 6|= ⊥;
4. M |= φ ∧ ψ if M |= φ and M |= ψ,
5. M |= φ ∨ ψ, if M |= φ or M |= ψ,
6. M |= φ→ ψ if (i) M 6|= φ or M |= ψ, and (ii) 〈I,K〉 |= φ→ ψ4;
7. M |= ∀xφ(x) if M |= φ(cε) and 〈I,K〉 |= φ(cε) for all ε ∈ U ;
8. M |= ∃xφ(x) if M |= φ(cε) for some ε ∈ U ;.
A QHT-interpretation M = 〈I, J,K〉 is called a QHT-countermodel of a theory Γ iff
M 6|= Γ; it is called total if J = K . A total QHT-interpretation M = 〈I,K,K〉 is called a
quantified equilibrium model (QEL-model) of a theory Γ, iff M |= Γ and M ′ 6|= Γ, for all
QHT-interpretations M ′ = 〈I, J,K〉 such that J ⊂ K . A first-order interpretation 〈I,K〉
is an answer set of Γ iff M = 〈I,K,K〉 is a QEL-model of a theory Γ.
In analogy to the propositional case, we will use the following simple properties. If
〈I, J,K〉 |= φ then 〈I,K,K〉 |= φ; and 〈I, J,K〉 |= ¬φ iff 〈I,K〉 |= ¬φ.
4.2 Characterizing Equivalence by QHT-countermodels
We aim at generalizing uniform equivalence for first-order theories, in its most liberal form,
which means wrt. factual theories. For this purpose, we first lift Lemma 1.
Lemma 3
Let φ be a factual sentence. If 〈I, J,K〉 |= φ and J ⊆ J ′ ⊆ K , then 〈I, J ′,K〉 |= φ.
3 We use angle brackets to distinguish from HT-interpretations.
4 That is, 〈I,K〉 satisfies φ→ ψ classically.
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Proof
The proof is by induction on the formula structure of φ. Let M = 〈I, J,K〉, M |= φ, and
M ′ = 〈I, J ′,K〉 for some J ⊆ J ′ ⊆ K . For the base case, consider an atomic sentence
φ. If φ is of the form p(t1, . . . , tn), then p(ctI
1
, . . . , ctIn) ∈ J because M |= φ. By the fact
that J ′ ⊇ J we conclude that p(ctI
1
, . . . , ctIn) ∈ J
′ and hence M ′ |= φ. If φ is of the form
t1 = t2 then M |= φ implies tI1 = tI2, and thus M ′ |= φ. Note also that M |= φ implies
φ 6= ⊥. This proves the claim for atomic formulas.
For the induction step, assume that M |= φ implies M ′ |= φ, for any sentence of depth
n−1, and let φ be a sentence of depth n. We show thatM |= φ impliesM ′ |= φ. Suppose φ
is the conjunction or disjunction of two sentences φ1 and φ2. Then φ1 and φ2 are sentences
of depth n − 1. Hence, M |= φ1 implies M ′ |= φ1, and the same for φ2. Therefore, if
M models both or one of the sentences then so does M ′, which implies M |= φ implies
M ′ |= φ if φ is the conjunction or disjunction of two sentences. As for implication, since
φ is factual we just need to consider the case where φ is of the form φ1 → ⊥, i.e., ¬φ1.
Then, M |= ¬φ1 iff 〈I,K〉 |= ¬φ1 iff M ′ |= ¬φ1. This provesM |= φ implies M ′ |= φ if
φ is an implication with ⊥ as its consequence. Eventually, consider a quantified sentence
φ, i.e., φ is of the form ∀xφ1(x) or ∃xφ1(x). In this case, M |= φ implies M |= φ1(cε)
and 〈I,K〉 |= φ1(cε), for all ε ∈ U , respectively M |= φ1(cε), for some ε ∈ U , in case of
existential quantification. Since each of the sentences φ1(cε) is of depth n − 1, the same
is true for M ′ by assumption, i.e., M ′ |= φ1(cε) and 〈I,K〉 |= φ1(cε), for all ε ∈ U ,
respectively M ′ |= φ1(cε), for some ε ∈ U . It follows that M |= φ implies M ′ |= φ also
for quantified sentences φ of depth n, and therefore, for any sentence φ of depth n. This
proves the claim.
The different notions of closure naturally extend to (sets of) QHT-interpretations. In
particular, a total QHT-interpretation M = 〈I,K,K〉 is called total-closed in a set S of
QHT-interpretations if 〈I, J,K〉 ∈ S for every J ⊆ K . A QHT-interpretation 〈I, J,K〉 is
closed in a set S of QHT-interpretations if 〈I, J ′,K〉 ∈ S for every J ⊆ J ′ ⊆ K , and it is
there-closed in S if 〈I,K,K〉 6∈ S and 〈I, J ′,K〉 ∈ S for every J ⊆ J ′ ⊂ K .
The first main result lifts the characterization of uniform equivalence for theories by
HT-countermodels to the first-order case.
Theorem 5
Two first-order theories are uniformly equivalent iff they have the same sets of there-closed
QHT-countermodels.
The proof idea is the same as in the propositional case, thus for space reasons the proof is
skipped. The same applies to Theorem 6 and Proposition 7 (cf. (Fink 2009) for full proofs).
We next turn to an alternative characterization by a mixture of QHT-models and QHT-
countermodels as in the propositional case. A QHT-countermodel 〈I, J,K〉 of a theory Γ
is called QHT here-countermodel of Γ if 〈I,K〉 |= Γ. A QHT-interpretation 〈I, J,K〉 is
an QHT equivalence-interpretation of a theory Γ, if it is a total QHT-model of Γ or a QHT
here-countermodel of Γ. In slight abuse of notation, we reuse the notation Se, S ∈ {C,E}
and e ∈ {c, a, s, u}, for respective sets of QHT-interpretations, and arrive at the following
formal result:
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Theorem 6
Two theories coincide on their QHT-countermodels iff they have the same QHT equivalence-
interpretations, in symbols Cs(Γ1) = Cs(Γ2) iff Es(Γ1) = Es(Γ2).
As a consequence of these two main results, we obtain an elegant, unified formal charac-
terization of the different notions of equivalence for first-order theories under generalized
answer-set semantics.
Corollary 5
Given two first-order theories Γ1 and Γ2, the following propositions are equivalent for
e ∈ {c, a, s, u}: Γ1 ≡e Γ2; Ce(Γ1) = Ce(Γ2); Ee(Γ1) = Ee(Γ2).
Moreover, lifting the characterization of HT-countermodels provided in Proposition 2
to the first-order setting, allows us to prove a property, which simplifies the treatment of
extended signatures.
Proposition 7
Let M be a QHT-interpretation over L on U . Then, M ∈ Es(Γ) for a theory Γ iff M |=
Γφ(M) for some φ ∈ Γ, where Γφ(M) = {¬¬ψ | ψ ∈ Γ} ∪ {φ → (¬¬a → a) | a ∈
BP,CU}.
For QHT-models it is known that M |= Γ implies M |L |= Γ (cf. e.g., Proposition 3
in (de Bruijn et al. 2007)), hence M |L 6|= Γ implies M 6|= Γ, i.e., M |L ∈ Cs(Γ) implies
M ∈ Cs(Γ). The converse direction holds for totality preserving restrictions (the proof
appeared in (Fink 2008) and can also be found in (Fink 2009)):
Theorem 7
Let Γ be a theory over L, let L′ ⊃ L, and let M a QHT-interpretation over L′ such that
M |L is totality preserving. Then, M ∈ Cs(Γ) implies M |L ∈ Cs(Γ).
Note that this property carries over to QHT-models, i.e., M |L |= Γ implies M |= Γ,
if M |L is the restriction of M to L and this restriction is totality preserving. Otherwise,
by the above result M 6|= Γ would imply M |L 6|= Γ. We remark that in (Fink 2008) it is
erroneously stated informally that this property does not hold for QHT-models, however
the counter-example given there is flawed (Example 5 in (Fink 2008)).
4.3 Relativized Hyperequivalence for First-Order Theories
In this section we extend the notion of relativized hyperequivalence to first-order theories.
For this purpose, we distinguish positive and negative occurrences of predicates in sen-
tences. More precisely, the occurrence of a predicate p in a sentence φ is called positive
if φ is implication free, if p occurs in the consequent of an implication in φ, or if φ is of
the form (φ1 → φ2) → φ3 and p occurs in φ1. An occurrence of p is called negative if p
occurs in the antecedent of an implication. The notion of positive and negative occurrence
is again extended to (sub-)sentences in the obvious way.
Let Γ be a first-order theory over L = 〈F , L+ ∪ L−〉, where L+ and L− are sets of
predicate symbols with an associated arity, such that if a predicate symbol p occurs in both
L+ and L−, then it is also associated the same arity. We say that Γ is an L+-L−-theory if
24 M. Fink
its sentences have positive occurrences of predicates from L+, and negative occurrences of
predicates from L−, only. As in the propositional case, ⊥ is allowed to appear positively
and negatively, and the same holds for equality in the first-order case. Moreover, an L+-
L−-theory is called extended, if additionally factual formulas over L+ are permitted.
Definition 10
Two first-order theories Γ1,Γ2 over L are called relativized hyperequivalent wrt. L+ and
L−, symbolically Γ1 L
+
L−
≡ Γ2, iff for any L+-L−-theory Γ overL′ ⊇ L, Γ1∪Γ and Γ2∪Γ
are answer-set equivalent.
The properties proven for HT-interpretations and extendedA+-A−-theories in the propo-
sitional case, carry over to QHT-interpretations and extended L+-L−-theories in a straight
forward manner.
Proposition 8
Consider an extended first-order L+-L−-theory Γ, and a QHT-interpretation 〈I, J,K〉.
Then, 〈I, J,K〉 |= Γ implies 〈I, J ′,K〉 |= Γ, for all J ′ ⊆ K such that J |L+ ⊆ J ′|L+ and
J ′|L− ⊆ J |L− .
The proof is lengthy and does not convey particular new insights, therefore it is skipped
here (cf. (Fink 2009)). The main differences to the propositional case concern the treat-
ment of equality of terms and that quantification has to be taken into account. The former
depends solely on the interpretation part I , which is the same for the QHT-interpretations
under consideration, and thus has no further influence on the argument. The latter, is a fur-
ther case to be considered in the inductive argument, however one that reduces easily to the
respective induction hypotheses. The remainder simply mirrors the propositional case, with
the polarity being considered on the predicate level, rather than for propositional variables.
The same holds for the proofs of the remaining results in this section.
Proposition 9
Consider an extended first-orderL+-L−-theoryΓ, and a total QHT-interpretation 〈I,K,K〉.
Then, 〈I,K,K〉 |= Γ implies 〈I, J ′,K〉 |= Γ, for all J ′ ⊆ K such that J ′|L+ = K|L+ .
Having lifted the essential properties to the case of L+-L−-theories, it comes at no
surprise that we end up with respective closure conditions for QHT-equivalence interpre-
tations.
Definition 11
Given a first-order theory Γ overL, sets of predicate symbolsL+ ⊆ L′, L− ⊆ L′, L′ ⊇ L,
and a QHT-interpretation M = 〈I, J,K〉, we say that
• 〈I,K,K〉 is L+-total iff 〈I,K|L+ ,K〉 is closed in Es(Γ);
• M is L+-closed in Es(Γ) iff 〈I, J ′,K〉 ∈ Es(Γ), for all J ′ ⊆ K such that J |L+ ⊆
J ′|L+ and J ′|L− ⊆ J |L− .
Also the characteristic structures for a semantic characterization are defined in straight-
forward analogy.
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Definition 12
A QHT-interpretation M = 〈I, J,K〉 is a QHT-hyperequivalence interpretation wrt. L+
and L− of a first-order theory Γ iff 〈I,K,K〉 is L+-total and there exists a QHT-inter-
pretation 〈I, J ′,K〉 such that J = J ′|L+∪L− and 〈I, J ′,K〉 is L+-closed in Es(Γ).
The set of QHT-hyperequivalence interpretations wrt. L+ and L− of a first-order theory Γ
is denoted by EL+
L−
(Γ).
Eventually, we arrive at a characterization of relativized hyperequivalence for general
first-order theories under answer-set semantics, where contexts are restricted on the predi-
cate level.
Theorem 8
Two first-order theories Γ1,Γ2 are relativized hyperequivalent wrt. L+ and L− if and only











In the same way as for propositional theories, the prominent notions of equivalence are
obtained as special cases, and the framework gives rise to relativized notions of strong and
uniform equivalence for general first-order theories under answer-set semantics. Also in
analogy, the role of factual theories is governed by Proposition 8, yielding the following:
Corollary 6
Two first-order theories Γ1,Γ2 are relativized hyperequivalent wrt. extended L+-L−-theo-
ries if and only if they coincide on their QHT-hyperequivalence interpretations wrt. L+
and L−.
5 Non-ground Logic Programs
In this section we apply the characterizations obtained for first-order theories to non-ground
logic programs under various extended semantics—compared to the traditional semantics
in terms of Herbrand interpretations. For a proper treatment of these issues, further back-
ground is required and introduced (succinctly, but at sufficient detail) below.
In non-ground logic programming, we restrict to a function-free first-order signature
L = 〈F ,P〉 (i.e., F contains object constants only) without equality. A program Π (over
L) is a set of rules (over L) of the form (1). A rule r is safe if each variable occurring in
H(r) ∪ B−(r) also occurs in B+(r); a rule r is ground, if all atoms occurring in it are
ground. A program is safe, respectively ground, if all of its rules enjoy this property.
Given Π over L and a universe U , let LU be the extension of L as before. The grounding
of Π wrt. U and an interpretation I|LF of LF on U is defined as the set grdU (Π, I|LF )
of ground rules obtained from r ∈ Π by (i) replacing any constant c in r by cε such that
I|LF (c) = ε, and (ii) all possible substitutions of elements in CU for the variables in r.
Adapted from (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991), the reduct of a program Π with respect to
a first-order interpretation I = 〈I|LF , I|CU 〉 on universe U , in symbols grdU (Π, I|LF )I , is
given by the set of rules
a1 ∨ · · · ∨ ak ← b1, . . . , bm,
obtained from rules in grdU(Π, I|LF ) of the form (1), such that I |= ai for all k < i ≤ l
and I 6|= bj for all m < j ≤ n.
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A first-order interpretation I satisfies a rule r, I |= r, iff I |= Γr, where Γr = ∀~x(βr →
αr), ~x are the free variables in r, αr is the disjunction of H(r), and βr is the conjunction
of B(r). It satisfies a program Π, symbolically I |= Π, iff it satisfies every r ∈ Π, i.e., if
I |= ΓΠ, where ΓΠ =
⋃
r∈Π Γr.
A first-order interpretation I is called a generalized answer set of Π iff it satisfies
grdU(Π, I|LF )
I and it is subset minimal among the interpretations of L on U with this
property.
Traditionally, only Herbrand interpretations are considered as the answer sets of a logic
program. The set of all (object) constants occurring in Π is called the Herbrand universe of
Π, symbolically H. If no constant appears in Π, then H = {c}, for an arbitrary constant c.
A Herbrand interpretation is any interpretation I of LH = 〈H,P〉 onH interpreting object
constants by identity, id , i.e., I(c) = id(c) = c for all c ∈ H. A Herbrand interpretation I
is an ordinary answer set of Π iff it is subset minimal among the interpretations of LH on
H satisfying grdH(Π, id)I .
Furthermore, an extended Herbrand interpretation is an interpretation of L on U ⊇ F
interpreting object constants by identity. An extended Herbrand interpretation I is an open
answer set (Heymans et al. 2007) of Π iff it is subset minimal among the interpretations of
L on U satisfying grdU (Π, id)I .
Note that since we consider programs without equality, we semantically resort to the
logic QHTs, which results from QHTs= by dropping the axioms for equality. Concerning
Kripke models, however, in slight abuse of notation, we reuse QHT-models as defined for
the general case. A QHT-interpretation M = 〈I, J,K〉 is called an (extended) QHT Her-
brand interpretation, if 〈I,K〉 is an (extended) Herbrand interpretation. Given a program
Π, 〈I,K〉 is a generalized answer set of Π iff 〈I,K,K〉 is a QEL-model of ΓΠ, and 〈I,K〉
is an open, respectively ordinary, answer set of Π iff 〈I,K,K〉 is an extended Herbrand,
respectively Herbrand, QEL-model of ΓΠ. Notice that the static interpretation of constants
introduced by Item (i) of the grounding process is essential for this correspondences in
terms of QHTs. Abusing notation, we further on identify Π and ΓΠ.
As already mentioned for propositional programs, uniform equivalence is usually un-
derstood wrt. sets of ground facts (i.e., ground atoms). Obviously, uniform equivalence
wrt. factual theories implies uniform equivalence wrt. ground atoms. We show the converse
direction (lifting Theorem 2 in (Pearce and Valverde 2004), for a proof see (Fink 2009)).
Proposition 10
Given two programs Π1,Π2, then Π1 ≡u Π2 iff (Π1 ∪ A) ≡a (Π2 ∪ A), for any set of
ground atoms A.
Thus, there is no difference whether we consider uniform equivalence wrt. sets of ground
facts or factual theories. Since one can also consider sets of clauses, i.e. disjunctions of
atomic formulas and their negations, which is a more suitable representation of facts ac-
cording to the definition of program rules in this article, we adopt the following terminol-
ogy. A rule r is called a fact if B(r) = ∅, and a factual program is a set of facts. Then, by
our result Π1 ≡u Π2 holds for programsΠ1,Π2 iff (Π1 ∪Π) ≡a (Π2 ∪Π), for any factual
program Π.
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5.1 Uniform Equivalence under Herbrand Interpretations
The results in the previous section generalize the notion of uniform equivalence to pro-
grams under generalized open answer-set semantics and provide alternative characteriza-
tions for other notions of equivalence. They apply to programs under open answer-set
semantics and ordinary answer-set semantics, when QHT-interpretations are restricted to
extended Herbrand interpretations and Herbrand interpretations, respectively. In order to
capture strong and uniform equivalence under ordinary answer-set semantics correctly,
interpretations under the Standard Name Assumption (SNA) have to be considered, ac-
counting for the potential extensions. For programsΠ1 and Π2 and e ∈ {c, a, s, u}, we use
Π1 ≡Ee Π2 andΠ1 ≡He Π2 to denote (classical, answer-set, strong, or uniform) equivalence
under open answer-set semantics and ordinary answer-set semantics, respectively.
Corollary 7
Given two programs Π1 and Π2, it holds that
• Π1 ≡Ee Π2, C
E
e (Π1) = C
E
e (Π2), and EEe (Π1) = EEe (Π2) are equivalent; and
• Π1 ≡He Π2, C
H
e (Π1) = C
H
e (Π2), and EHe (Π1) = EHe (Π2) are equivalent;
where e ∈ {c, a, s, u}, superscript E denotes the restriction to extended Herbrand interpre-
tations, and superscriptH denotes the restriction to Herbrand interpretations for e ∈ {c, a},
respectively to SNA interpretations for e ∈ {s, u}.
For safe programs open answer sets and ordinary answer sets coincide (de Bruijn et al. 2007).
Note that a fact is safe if it is ground. We obtain that uniform equivalence coincides under
the two semantics even for programs that are not safe. Intuitively, the potential addition
of arbitrary facts accounts for the difference in the semantics since it requires to consider
larger domains than the Herbrand universe.5
Theorem 9
Let Π1,Π2 be programs over L. Then, Π1 ≡Eu Π2 iff Π1 ≡Hu Π2.
Proof
The only-if direction is trivial. For the if direction, towards a contradiction assume that
Π1 ≡
H
u Π2 and Π1 6≡Eu Π2. Let Π be a factual program such that M = 〈id ,K,K〉 is an
extended Herbrand QHT-interpretation over L′ ⊇ L on U ′, such that M is in EEa (Π1 ∪Π),
but M 6∈ EEa (Π2 ∪ Π). Consider the signature LU ′ = 〈U ′,L′P ∪ {d}〉, where L′P are the
predicate symbols of L′, and d 6∈ L′P is a fresh unary predicate symbol. Clearly, LU ′ ⊃ L′.
Furthermore let Π′1 = Π1 ∪Π∪ {d(X)}, Π′2 = Π2 ∪Π∪ {d(X)}, and K ′ = K ∪ {d(c) |
c ∈ U ′}. We show that M ′ = 〈id ,K ′,K ′〉 is in EHa (Π′1), but M ′ 6∈ EHa (Π′2). Since
M |= Π1 ∪ Π and no sentence in Π1 ∪ Π involves d, we conclude M ′ |= Π1 ∪ Π. By
construction, M ′ is also a QHT-model of d(X), hence M ′ |= Π′1. Moreover, 〈id , J,K〉 6|=
Π1∪Π, for every J ⊂ K . Therefore, for every J ′ = J ∪{d(c) | c ∈ U ′} such that J ⊂ K ,
〈id , J ′,K ′〉 6|= Π′1. So let us consider proper subsets J ′ of K ′ such that K ⊆ J , i.e.,
J ′ ⊂ {d(c) | c ∈ U ′}. In this case 〈id , J ′,K ′〉 6|= d(X), and again 〈id , J ′,K ′〉 6|= Π′1. This
proves that M ′ is in EHa (Π′1). On the other hand, if M 6|= Π2∪Π, thenM 6|= Π2, and since
5 Note that this also holds for QHTs= with functions and the result could be strengthened accordingly.
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no sentence in Π2 involves d, we concludeM ′ 6|= Π2, thusM ′ 6|= Π′2. IfM |= Π2∪Π, then
〈id , J,K〉 |= Π2 ∪Π for some J ⊂ K . Consider J ′ = J ∪ {d(c) | c ∈ U ′}. Since J ⊂ K ,
it holds that J ′ ⊂ K ′, and since no sentence in Π2 ∪Π involves d, 〈id , J ′,K ′〉 |= Π2 ∪Π.
Moroever, 〈id , J ′,K ′〉 |= {d(X)} by construction, hence 〈id , J ′,K ′〉 |= Π′2. This proves
M ′ 6∈ EHa (Π
′
2). Note that Π ∪ {d(X)} is a factual program; contradiction.
Finally, we turn to the practically relevant setting of finite, possibly unsafe, programs
under Herbrand interpretations, i.e., ordinary (and open) answer-set semantics. For finite
programs, uniform equivalence can be characterized by HT-models of the grounding, also
for infinite domains. In other words, the problems of “infinite chains” as in Example 1
cannot be generated by the process of grounding. Note that the restriction to finite programs
also applies to the programs considered to be potentially added.
Theorem 10
Let Π1,Π2 be finite programs over L. Then, Π1 ≡Hu Π2 iff Π1 and Π2 have the same (i)
total and (ii) maximal, non-total extended Herbrand QHT-models.
Proof
The only-if direction is obvious. If Π1 ≡Hu Π2 then also Π1 ≡Eu Π2 by Theorem 9. This
means that Π1 and Π2 have (i) the same total extended Herbrand QHT-models, as well as
the same sets of closed extended Herbrand QHT equivalence interpretations, and thus (ii)
the same maximal, non-total extended Herbrand QHT-models.
For the if direction, assume that Π1 and Π2 have the same total and the same maximal,
non-total extended Herbrand QHT-models but, towards a contradiction, that Π1 6≡Hu Π2.
Then, there exists a finite factual program Π, such that (Π1∪Π) 6≡Ha (Π2∪Π). W.l.o.g. let
M = 〈I,K,K〉 over L′ ⊇ L be in EHa (Π1 ∪Π) and M 6∈ EHa (Π2 ∪Π). Let H denote the
Herbrand universe of Π1 ∪ Π. Since Π1 and Π are finite, H is finite and so is grdH(Π1 ∪
Π, id). Therefore, by minimality, K is finite as well. Note also, that M is a total extended
Herbrand QHT-model of Π1. By hypothesis (i), Π1 and Π2 have the same total extended
Herbrand QHT-models. Thus, M is also a total extended Herbrand QHT-model of Π2.
Moreover, there exists a QHT-interpretation M ′ = 〈I, J,K〉, such that J ⊂ K and M ′ |=
(Π2∪Π), henceM ′ |= Π2. SinceK is finite, we conclude that Π2 has a maximal, non-total
QHT-model M ′′ = 〈I, J ′′,K〉, such that J ′ ⊆ J ′′ ⊂ K . We show that this is not the case
for Π1. M ′ |= (Π2 ∪ Π) implies M ′ |= Π. Since Π is a factual program, by Lemma 3
we conclude that M ′′ |= Π. However M ′′ 6|= Π1 ∪ Π, because M ∈ EHa (Π1 ∪ Π). Taken
together,M ′′ |= Π andM ′′ 6|= Π1∪Π impliesM ′′ 6|= Π1. Therefore,M ′′ is not a maximal,
non-total QHT-model of Π1. Observing that M ′′ is an Herbrand QHT-model over L′ and
L′ ⊇ L, we conclude that M ′′ is a maximal non-total extended Herbrand QHT-model of
Π2, but not of Π1. Contradiction.
6 Conclusion
Countermodels in equilibrium logic have recently been used by Cabalar and Ferraris (2007)
to show that propositional disjunctive logic programs with negation in the head are strongly
equivalent to propositional theories, and by Cabalar et al. (2007) to generate a minimal
logic program for a given propositional theory.
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By means of QEL, in (Lifschitz et al. 2007), the notion of strong equivalence has been
extended to first-order theories with equality, under the generalized notion of answer set we
have adopted. QEL has also been shown to capture open answer-sets (Heymans et al. 2007)
and generalized open answer-sets (Heymans et al. 2008), and is a promising framework
for hybrid knowledge bases, providing a unified semantics encompassing classical logic as
well as disjunctive logic programs under the answer-set semantics (de Bruijn et al. 2007).
Our results extend these foundations for the research of semantic properties in these
generalized settings. First, they complete the picture concerning the prominent notions of
equivalence by making uniform equivalence amenable to these generalized settings without
any finiteness restrictions, in particular on the domain. In addition, the developed notion
of relativized hyperequivalence interpretation provides a means for the study of more spe-
cific semantic relationships under generalized answer-set semantics. Thus, a general and
uniform model-theoretic framework is achieved for the characterization of various notions
of equivalence studied in ASP. We have also shown that for finite programs, i.e., those pro-
grams solvers are able to deal with, infinite domains do not cause the problems observed
for infinite propositional programs, when dealing with uniform equivalence in terms of
HT-models of the grounding.
An intersting theoretical problem for further work is to consider equivalences and corre-
spondence under projections of answer sets (Eiter et al. 2005; Oetsch et al. 2007; Pu¨hrer et al. 2008;
Pu¨hrer and Tompits 2009). It is not difficult to apply existing techniques to our character-
izations in order to obtain characterizations for projective versions of uniform and strong
equivalence, and for relativized notions thereof, i.e., as long as the same alphabet is per-
mitted for positive and negative occurrences in the context. However, it is not trivial to
characterize projective versions of relativized hyperequivalence in the general case, some-
thing which also has not been considered for propositional logic programs so far.
Concerning the application of our results, there is ongoing work on combining ontolo-
gies and nonmonotonic rules, an important issue in knowledge representation and reason-
ing for the Semantic Web. The study of equivalences and correspondences under an ap-
propriate (unifying) semantics, such as the generalizations of answer-set semantics char-
acterized by QEL, constitute a highly relevant topic for research in this application do-
main (Fink and Pearce 2009). Like for Datalog, uniform equivalence may serve investiga-
tions on query equivalence and query containment in these hybrid settings, and due to the
combination of two formalisms, more specific notions of equivalence are needed to ob-
tain the intended notions of correspondence. While our characterizations serve as a basis
for these investigations, in particular the simplified treatment of extended signatures for
(equivalence) interpretations is expected to be of avail, when considering separate alpha-
bets.
On the foundational level, our results raise the interesting question whether extensions
of intuitionistic logics that allow for a direct characterization of countermodels, or equiv-
alence interpretations, would provide a more suitable formal apparatus for the study of (at
least notions of uniform) equivalences in ASP.
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